Pig producers' perceptions of the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak and its effect on their biosecurity practices in Australia.

The Influenza Pandemic (H1N1/09) virus was first reported in humans in Mexico in April 2009 and a pandemic level was declared on 11th of June 2009 by the World Health Organization (Chan, 2009; WHO, 2009a). Public misconceptions about the transmission of H1N1/09 were caused by the inadequate naming of the disease as ‘swine influenza’. This cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the outbreak in the Australian human population and before the virus was reported in the first piggery in Australia in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011). The aims of this study were to evaluate pig producers’ perceptions about the virus and the outbreak financial impact and influence on on-farm biosecurity practices. A questionnaire was designed and posted to Australian Pork Limited (APL) members (n = 460), obtaining responses from 182 producers (39.6%). Pig producers had good general knowledge on potential transmission pathways for H1N1/09 between people, with direct or close contact with a sick person perceived as the most likely pathways. Changes on biosecurity practices, such as asking visitors if they had recently been overseas (27.8%) and not allowing any visitor to inspect their pigs (18.3%), were reported among respondents. In addition, approximately 40% of producers asked their employees to notify flu like symptoms, consulted a veterinarian on H1N1/09 and visited websites to seek information on H1N1/09. A higher adoption of these practices was observed among large (> 100 sows) than small herds. Only 2.9% of respondents reported a reduction in pig sales during the outbreak. However, approximately one third of producers reported being financially and emotionally stressed, 38.2% were distressed about the health of their pigs and 16.7% about their own health. The most important sources of information were APL (93%), veterinarians (89%) and the state Department of Primary Industries (DPI) (75%). The first two considered the most trusted sources of information. Television, radio and other farmers were considered more important sources of information by small herds and veterinarians by larger herds. Producers believed that the H1N1/09 outbreak was better managed by the pork industry (89.9%) than by the health authorities (58.8%), and the on-going communication with APL was the main strength of the outbreak management. Communication and extension programs in future outbreaks should consider the needs of all sectors of the pig industry to increase their effectiveness. Keywords: H1N1/09, Influenza Pandemic, pig producers, risk perception, biosecuritythe Faculty of Veterinary Science, The University of Sydney, provided funding to conduct this stud

Public perceptions of the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 from pigs and pork products in Australia

A cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the pandemic influenza H1N1/09 outbreak in Australia in 2009. The objectives of the study were to evaluate public perceptions about transmission and prevention of the disease, to understand their concerns and preparedness to cope with the disease, and to investigate drivers influencing their behaviour. A questionnaire was designed and administered to 510 customers visiting 15 butcher shops in the Greater Sydney region between 26th June and 2nd August 2009. Data were analysed to estimate the proportion of people with certain perceptions and to evaluate the influence of these perceptions on two binary outcome variables: (1) whether or not people believed that avoiding pork would protect them from contracting H1N1/09, and (2) whether or not they actually made some changes to pork consumption after the outbreak. A majority of the respondents had perceptions based on fact about transmission and prevention of H1N1/09. As many as 96.8 % of the respondents believed that washing their hands frequently was likely to protect them from contracting H1N1/09. Similarly, most believed that they could contract H1N1/09 by travelling on public transport with a sick person present (94.1%), by shaking hands with a sick person (89.2%), or by attending a community gathering (73.7%). Women were more likely than men to have factual perceptions about protective behaviours. Misconceptions regarding transmission of the disease were evident, with 21.7% believing that avoiding eating pork could protect them against H1N1/09, 11.1% believing that they could contract H1N1/09 by drinking tap water, 22.8% by handling uncooked pork meat and 15.6% by eating cooked pork. Approximately one third of respondents believed that working in a pig farm or an abattoir increased their likelihood of contracting H1N1/09 (36.9% and 32.3%, respectively). Younger people (<35 years old) were more likely to have these misconceptions than older people. Reduction in consumption of pork, ham or bacon was significantly associated with misconceptions regarding the risk of contracting H1N1/09 from eating pig meat products. It is recommended that in the event of a future disease emergency, communication activities providing factual information and targeting younger people should be used. Keywords: Pandemic influenza; A/H1N1; swine flu; perceptions; concerns; behaviour; health emergenc

Understanding biosecurity behaviors of Australian beef cattle farmers using the ten basic human values framework

IntroductionOn-farm biosecurity is an essential component of successful disease management in the beef cattle industry on an individual, regional, and national level. Participation in mandatory or voluntary assurance schemes, knowledge and trusted relationships have all been demonstrated to contribute to the development of behaviors that promote biosecurity. However, compliance with rules, socio-psychological relationships and knowledge-seeking behavior are all contingent upon the motivations and beliefs of the individual. It is widely accepted that the motivations and beliefs of all cultures can be defined by ten basic values (Self-direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism). In this study, we use the ten basic values to characterize the on-farm biosecurity behaviors of Australian beef farmers to facilitate the identification of interventions that are most likely to align with producer motivations and therefore, more likely to result in wider adoption of effective on-farm biosecurity.MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 Australian beef farmers to discuss the reasons behind decisions to alter or implement biosecurity practices in response to endemic diseases. Thematic analysis was used to identify the motivations, opportunities, and capability of biosecurity behaviors. The ten basic human values were used to characterize these behaviors and inform enablers and barriers to biosecurity adoption.Results and discussionBenevolence and Self-direction, relating to self-transcendence and an openness to change, were the principal values associated with good biosecurity behaviors. This suggests that farmers will be receptive to education strategies that communicate the actual risk of disease in their area, the impact of disease on animal welfare, and the ability for on-farm biosecurity to mitigate these impacts. Farmers also expressed values of Security which entrenched behaviors as common practice; however, in some cases the Security of trusted relationships was identified as a potential barrier to behavior change. Overall, values associated with biosecurity behaviors were found to align with values that are most important for social cohesion, suggesting that collaborative disease efforts between industry stakeholders and farmers are likely to succeed if designed with these values in mind

Pengaruh Jumlah Dan Kriteria Buah Muda Yang Dipertahankan Terhadap Hasil Buah Mangga ( Effect of Number and Criteria of Maintained Young Fruits on Yield of Mango)

The aim of this research was to get optimum number of maintained young fruit per panicle and good criteria of fruit that must be maintained so it will get a high yield of mango. The factors under investigation were number of young fruit to be maintained per panicle: 2, 4, and 6; the criteria of young fruit to be maintained: the biggest fruit, fruit attached at the beginning of panicle, and fruit attached at panicle at the same distance. The result of research showed that 6 fruits that maintained per panicle gave the highest weight per tree of mango (33,45 kg), but the lowest weight per fruit (466,98 kg). Maintaining the 2 biggest fruits of mango gave the highest weight per fruit (510,53 g)

Reflecting on One Health in Action During the COVID-19 Response

The COVID-19 pandemic, a singular disruptive event in recent human history, has required rapid, innovative, coordinated and collaborative approaches to manage and ameliorate its worst impacts. However, the threat remains, and learning from initial efforts may benefit the response management in the future. One Health approaches to managing health challenges through multi-stakeholder engagement are underscored by an enabling environment. Here we describe three case studies from state (New South Wales, Australia), national (Ireland), and international (sub-Saharan Africa) scales which illustrate different aspects of One Health in action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Ireland, a One Health team was assembled to help parameterise complex mathematical and resource models. In New South Wales, state authorities engaged collaboratively with animal health veterinarians and epidemiologists to leverage disease outbreak knowledge, expertise and technical and support structures for application to the COVID-19 emergency. The African One Health University Network linked members from health institutions and universities from eight countries to provide a virtual platform knowledge exchange on COVID-19 to support the response. Themes common to successful experiences included a shared resource base, interdisciplinary engagement, communication network strategies, and looking global to address local need. The One Health approaches used, particularly shared responsibility and knowledge integration, are benefiting the management of this pandemic and future One Health global challenges

Biosecurity practices on Australian commercial layer and meat chicken farms: Performance and perceptions of farmers

This paper describes the level of adoption of biosecurity practices performed on Australian commercial chicken meat and layer farms and farmer-perceived importance of these practices. On-farm interviews were conducted on 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer farms, six free range meat chicken farms and 15 barn meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. There was a high level of treatment of drinking water across all farm types; town water was the most common source. In general, meat chicken farms had a higher level of adoption of biosecurity practices than layer farms. Cage layer farms had the shortest median distance between sheds (7.75m) and between sheds and waterbodies (30m). Equipment sharing between sheds was performed on 43% of free range meat chicken farms compared to 92% of free range layer farms. There was little disinfection of this shared equipment across all farm types. Footbaths and visitor recording books were used by the majority of farms for all farm types except cage layer farms (25%). Wild birds in sheds were most commonly reported in free range meat chicken farms (73%). Dogs and cats were kept across all farm types, from 56% of barn layer farms to 89% of cage layer farms, and they had access to the sheds in the majority (67%) of cage layer farms and on the range in some free range layer farms (44%). Most biosecurity practices were rated on average as ‘very important’ by farmers. A logistic regression analysis revealed that for most biosecurity practices, performing a practice was significantly associated with higher perceived farmer importance of that biosecurity practice. These findings help identify farm types and certain biosecurity practices with low adoption levels. This information can aid decision-making on efforts used to improve adoption levels.This research was conducted within the Poultry Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) (http:// www.chicken.org.au/page.php?id=26) that provided the majority of funding with support from the CRC and Woolworths Limited (https://www. woolworths.com.au/). The first author, ABS, is also a recipient of a Post-graduate Scholarship and stipend from the Poultry CRC

Comparisons of management practices and farm design on Australian commercial layer and meat chicken farms: Cage, barn and free range

There are few published studies describing the unique management practices, farm design and housing characteristics of commercial meat chicken and layer farms in Australia. In particular, there has been a large expansion of free range poultry production in Australia in recent years, but limited information about this enterprise exists. This study aimed to describe features of Australian commercial chicken farms, with particular interest in free range farms, by conducting on-farm interviews of 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer farms, six free range meat chicken farms and 15 barn meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. Comparisons between the different enterprises (cage, barn and free range) were explored, including stocking densities, depopulation procedures, environmental control methods and sources of information for farmers. Additional information collected for free range farms include range size, range characteristics and range access. The median number of chickens per shed was greatest in free range meat chicken farms (31,058), followed by barn meat chicken (20,817), free range layer (10,713), barn layer (9,300) and cage layer farms (9,000). Sheds had cooling pads and tunnel ventilation in just over half of both barn and free range meat chicken farms (53%, n = 8) and was least common in free range layer farms (16%, n = 4). Range access in free range meat chicken farms was from sunrise to dark in the majority (93%, n = 14) of free range meat chicken farms. Over half of free range layer farms (56%, n = 14) granted range access at a set time each morning; most commonly between 9:00 to 10.00am (86%, n = 12), and chickens were placed back inside sheds when it was dusk.This study was supported by Poultry Cooperative Research Centre (CRC), http://www. poultrycrc.com.au/about-us/. The Poultry CRC provided the majority of funding for this project included post-doc activities and a stipend for the PhD student. This study was also supported by Woolworths Limited, https://www.woolworths com.au/. Woolworths provided extra financial support for this project when needed. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscri

Low- and high-pathogenic avian influenza H5 and H7 spread risk assessment within and between Australian commercial chicken farms

This study quantified and compared the probability of avian influenza (AI) spread within and between Australian commercial chicken farms via specified spread pathways using scenario tree mathematical modeling. Input values for the models were sourced from scientific literature, expert opinion, and a farm survey conducted during 2015 and 2016 on Australian commercial chicken farms located in New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland. Outputs from the models indicate that the probability of no establishment of infection in a shed is the most likely end-point after exposure and infection of low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) in one chicken for all farm types (non-free range meat chicken, free range meat chicken, cage layer, barn layer, and free range layer farms). If LPAI infection is established in a shed, LPAI is more likely to spread to other sheds and beyond the index farm due to a relatively low probability of detection and reporting during LPAI infection compared to high-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) infection. Among farm types, the median probability for HPAI spread between sheds and between farms is higher for layer farms (0.0019, 0.0016, and 0.0031 for cage, barn, and free range layer, respectively) than meat chicken farms (0.00025 and 0.00043 for barn and free range meat chicken, respectively) due to a higher probability of mutation in layer birds, which relates to their longer production cycle. The pathway of LPAI spread between sheds with the highest average median probability was spread via equipment (0.015; 5–95%, 0.0058–0.036) and for HPAI spread between farms, the pathway with the highest average median probability was spread via egg trays (3.70 × 10−5; 5–95%, 1.47 × 10−6–0.00034). As the spread model did not explicitly consider volume and frequency of the spread pathways, these results provide a comparison of spread probabilities per pathway. These findings highlight the importance of performing biosecurity practices to limit spread of the AI virus. The models can be updated as new information on the mechanisms of the AI virus and on the volume and frequency of movements shed-to-shed and of movements between commercial chicken farms becomes available.This study was funded by the Poultry Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) (Sub-project number 1.5.7) and by Woolworths Limited

Global wealth disparities drive adherence to COVID-safe pathways in head and neck cancer surgery

Peer reviewe

A Critical Appraisal of Global Testing Protocols for Zoonotic Parasites in Imported Seafood Applied to Seafood Safety in Australia

It is not suggested that any country is intentionally exporting seafood which does not comply with Codex seafood-safety guidelines/codes/standards. However, with an open access resource such as fisheries, there is vast potential for errors to occur along convoluted supply chains, spanning multiple countries, which may negatively impact the safety of edible seafood products imported into Australia. Australian importation policy and inspection procedures are founded upon a bedrock of trust in the integrity, reliability and safety of the global seafood supply chain. In order for seafood imported to Australia to be considered safe the non-mandatory international health standards, governed by Codex Alimentarius, for seafood must be predicated upon the most efficacious methods and stringently governed by each exporting provenance. Currently, tests for zoonotic parasites are not applied to imported edible seafood products on arrival into Australia. Therefore, this critical analysis is aimed at discussing the effectiveness of current testing protocols for zoonotic parasites in edible seafood advised by Codex Alimentarius which may impact the safety of the product imported into Australia